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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
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The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appeal 
the District Court’s ruling granting summary judgment in 
favor of AT&T Corp.  Core billed AT&T for terminating 
phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009.  When 
AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, 
which ruled in Core’s favor.  AT&T then filed suit in federal 
court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC 
lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic 
is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications 
Commission.  Because we find that the FCC’s jurisdiction 
over local ISP-bound traffic is not exclusive and the PPUC 
orders did not conflict with federal law, we will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court and remand this case for entry 




 Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 
19961 (TCA) to “fundamentally restructure[] local telephone 
markets.”2  Before the TCA, local telephone service 
companies operated as government-regulated monopolies.  
“States typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local 
service area to a local exchange carrier (LEC).”3  One of the 
TCA’s principal aims “was to end local telephone monopolies 
and develop a national telecommunications policy that 
                                              
1 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 




strongly favored local telephone market competition.”4  The 
TCA thus created two classes of LECs:  the new market 
entrants are considered “competitive” LECs (CLECs) and the 
former state-regulated monopolies are designated 
“incumbent” LECs (ILECs).5   
 
Recognizing the considerable barriers to entry 
associated with building out a network, the TCA required 
ILECs to allow CLECs to connect to their preexisting 
networks.6  “Interconnection allows customers of one LEC to 
call the customers of another, with the calling party’s LEC 
(the ‘originating’ carrier) transporting the call to the 
connection point, where the called party’s LEC (the 
‘terminating’ carrier) takes over and transports the call to its 
end point.”7  Without mandatory interconnection, a CLEC’s 
customers would not be able to connect with friends or family 
who are customers of other phone companies—whether ILEC 
or CLEC.   
 
Interconnection, of course, costs money.  The TCA 
aimed to solve the problem of cost allocation by requiring 
reciprocal payment arrangements, best understood as an 
                                              
4 Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc. (Global 
NAPs II), 454 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
5 See 47 U.S.C. § 251.  The term “competitive local exchange 
carrier” does not appear in the statute, but is commonly used 
to describe the non-incumbent LECs.  See, e.g., MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 498 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
6 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2).   
7 Global NAPs Cal., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 624 
F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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“originator pays” rule.  “In basic terms, when a customer of 
Carrier A places a local call to a customer of Carrier B, 
Carrier A must pay Carrier B for terminating the call, and 
vice versa.”8  “The logic behind this system was that, over 
time, the number of calls going each way would be essentially 
the same, and no LEC would pay more than its fair share of 
the costs associated with terminating other LECs’ traffic.”9  
Thus, all LECs have “[t]he duty to establish reciprocal 
compensation arrangements for the transport and termination 
of telecommunications.”10  But because the incumbents’ 
established market power gave them a potentially 
overwhelming advantage in negotiations, ILECs have a duty 
                                              
8 Peter W. Huber, et al., Federal Telecommunications Law 
§ 5.11.2 (2d ed. 1999).  The FCC clarified the compensation 
rules shortly after the TCA came into effect.  It determined 
that reciprocal compensation rules “apply only to traffic that 
originates and terminates within a local area”—that is, local 
traffic.  See In re Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and 
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, 11 FCC Rcd.  
15499, 16013 ¶ 1034 (1996) (Local Competition Order).  
Long distance calls, in contrast, are subject to “access 
charges,” 47 C.F.R. § 69.2(a), which “long distance 
companies are required to pay local-exchange carriers for the 
use of local network facilities.”  Global NAPs II, 454 F.3d at 
95. 
9 AT&T Commc’ns of Cal. v. Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., 651 
F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2011). 
10 47 U.S.C § 251(b)(5). 
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to negotiate interconnection agreements in good faith (as does 
the requesting telecommunications carrier).11 
Congress also provided an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure the formation of interconnection agreements.  Under 
47 U.S.C. § 252, either party to an interconnection agreement 
may request that the relevant state commission participate in 
contract negotiations and mediate any differences.12  If that 
fails, either LEC may petition the same state commission to 
arbitrate unresolved issues.13  But because § 252 proceedings 
govern only ILEC-CLEC disputes, it “leaves something of an 
enforcement gap:  CLECs have statutory duties to 
interconnect with other LECs . . ., but there is no procedure 
specified for one CLEC to require another CLEC to enter into 
an interconnection agreement that would govern the terms of 
those duties.”14  Accordingly, CLECs sometimes transmit 
traffic to each other without interconnection agreements. 
 
B. 
The advent of dial-up Internet invalidated the 
assumptions behind reciprocal arrangements.  Suddenly, 
many customers called ISPs with longer-duration calls that, 
unlike calls to friends and family, were never returned.  The 
FCC soon realized that this situation “creat[ed] an 
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage.”15  “Because traffic to 
                                              
11 Id. § 251(c)(1). 
12 Id. § 252(a)(2). 
13 Id. § 252(b)(1). 
14 Pac-West, 651 F.3d at 983 n.3. 
15 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 FCC Rcd. 9151, 
9187 ¶ 21 (2001) (ISP Remand Order). 
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ISPs flows one way, so does money in a reciprocal 
compensation regime,”16 and if a carrier could create a 
customer base entirely out of ISPs, it could be paid to 
terminate calls, without ever reciprocating.  Indeed, “[b]efore 
long, reciprocal compensation on ISP-bound traffic was 
costing ILECs billions.”17 
 
The FCC sought to address the problem in its 1999 
Declaratory Ruling.18  Because the FCC generally has 
jurisdiction over interstate communications and not purely 
intrastate communications,19 the FCC first considered its own 
jurisdiction using its traditional end-to-end jurisdictional 
analysis.20  The FCC found that although calls to the ISP 
                                              
16 Id. 
17 Huber, et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 5.11.2 
(emphasis omitted). 
18 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Inter-Carrier 
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 14 FCC Rcd. 3689 
(1999) (Declaratory Ruling). 
19 See  47 U.S.C. § 152. 
20 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3690 ¶ 1.  In a later 
order, the FCC provided a useful breakdown of its end-to-end 
jurisdictional approach:   
 
Using an end-to-end approach, when the end 
points of a carrier’s service are within the 
boundaries of a single state the service is 
deemed a purely intrastate service, subject to 
state jurisdiction for determining appropriate 
regulations to govern such service.  When a 
service’s end points are in different states or 
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itself were local, “the ultimate destination” is an “Internet 
website that is often located in another state,” so it asserted 
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic.21  More specifically, the 
FCC found that local ISP-bound traffic was “jurisdictionally 
mixed” because it “appears to be largely interstate.”22 
 
Following the same reasoning, the FCC found that the 
reciprocal compensation scheme of § 251, which applies to 
local traffic,23 does not apply to ISP-bound traffic.24  The 
FCC noted that, until it adopted a rule creating a new 
compensation structure, parties could voluntarily, but were 
not required to, include ISP-bound traffic in their otherwise 
mandatory interconnection agreements under §§ 251 and 
252.25  Despite the non-local nature of the traffic, the FCC 
                                                                                                     
between a state and a point outside the United 
States, the service is deemed a purely interstate 
service subject to the Commission’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.  Services that are capable of 
communications both between intrastate end 
points and between interstate end points are 
deemed to be “mixed-use” or “jurisdictionally 
mixed” services. 
 
In re Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 FCC Rcd. 22404, 22413 ¶ 
17 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
21 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3697 ¶ 12. 
22 Id. 
23 See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 16013 ¶ 
1034. 
24 See generally Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3703-06 
¶¶ 21-27. 
25 Id. at 3703 ¶ 22. 
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still saw a role for state commissions to decide, as part of the 
§ 252 arbitrations, whether reciprocal compensation should 
be required in a specific case.26 
After the FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling, ILECs 
petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit.27  The court vacated the ruling  
reasoning that, because the FCC considered the traffic local 
for some purposes, the FCC had failed to justify why § 251 
did not apply to the admittedly local traffic despite its 
“largely interstate” character.28  Although the standard end-to-
end jurisdictional analysis was valid on its own terms, the 
FCC had extended the reasoning to determine that the traffic 
was non-local for substantive rules.  The court held that the 
FCC provided no rationale for that inferential leap.29  
Notably, the court did not question or alter the jurisdictional 
analysis; it merely noted that the FCC had not demonstrated 
that the analysis was appropriate for any other use. 
 
In 2001, the FCC responded with the ISP Remand 
Order, reaching the same substantive conclusion—that local 
ISP-bound traffic is not subject to reciprocal compensation—
but on different legal grounds.  The FCC found that it had 
previously erred by trying to rigidly classify ISP-bound traffic 
as either local or long-distance for the purposes of 
                                              
26 Id. at 3704-05 ¶ 25. 
27 Bell Atl. Tel. Companies v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
28 Id. at 8 (noting a prior FCC litigation position “that a call to 
an information service provider is really like a call to a local 
business that then uses the telephone to order wares to meet 
the need”). 
29 Id. at 5. 
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§ 251(b)(5), and the Commission should instead have 
recognized that such traffic is a hybrid.30  Accordingly, the 
FCC ceased construing § 251(b)(5) using that dichotomy, 
instead reading § 251(g) to “limit[] the reach of the reciprocal 
compensation regime mandated in section 251(b).”31  Thus, 
all local traffic would be governed by the reciprocal 
compensation scheme unless it fell into one of the three 
categories outlined in § 251(g): “exchange access, 
information access, and exchange services.”32  The FCC 
found that ISP-bound traffic is indeed “information access,” 
and is therefore exempt from § 251(b)(5). 
 
Having established a new rationale for exempting ISP-
bound traffic from reciprocal compensation, the FCC invoked 
its general powers under § 201(b) “to address the market 
distortions under the current intercarrier compensation 
                                              
30 ISP Remand Order, 16 FCC Rcd. at 9164 ¶ 26-27 (“Upon 
further review, we find that the Commission erred in focusing 
on the nature of the service (i.e., local or long distance) and in 
stating that there were only two forms of telecommunications 
services – telephone exchange service and exchange access – 
for purposes of interpreting the relevant scope of section 
251(b)(5) . . ..  This balancing act reflected the historical view 
that there were only two kinds of intercarrier compensation:  
one for local telephone exchange service, and a second 
(access charges) for long distance services.  Attempting to 
describe a hybrid service (the nature being an access service, 
but subject to a compensation mechanism historically limited 
to local service) was always a bit of mental gymnastics.”); id. 
at 9172 ¶ 45. 
31 Id. at 9166-67 ¶ 34 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251(g)). 
32 Id. at 9170 ¶ 42. 
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regimes for ISP-bound traffic.”33  The Commission set forth a 
new “interim” compensation including four specific rules, the 
most important of which is the rate cap:  an upper bound to 
the prices LECs could charge for ISP-bound traffic.  This cap 
would, over time, move from $0.0015 per minute of use 
(MOU) to $0.0007/MOU, where it now continues to reside.34  
The FCC made clear that these caps are caps, not rates, and as 
such they “have no effect to the extent that states have 
ordered LECs to exchange ISP-bound traffic either at rates 
below the caps or on a bill and keep basis (or otherwise have 
not required payment of compensation for this traffic).”35   
 
In addition, the interim compensation scheme created a 
growth cap, limiting the overall number of minutes a LEC 
could be compensated for ISP traffic;36 the “new markets 
rule,” under which LECs that were not already party to 
interconnection agreements would exchange ISP-bound 
                                              
33 Id..at 9186 ¶ 77; see also 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“All charges, 
practices, classifications, and regulations for and in 
connection with such communication service, shall be just 
and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, 
or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be 
unlawful . . ..  The Commission may prescribe such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry 
out the provisions of this chapter.”). 
34 Id. at 9190-91 ¶ 85. 
35 Id. at 9188 ¶ 80.  In a “bill-and-keep” compensation 
regime, each carrier bills its own customers for “the cost of 
both originating traffic that it delivers to the other network 
and terminating traffic that it receives from the other 
network.”  Id. at 9154 ¶ 2 n.6.       
36 Id. at 9187 ¶ 78, 9191 ¶ 86. 
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traffic on a bill-and-keep basis;37 and the “mirroring rule,” 
under which ILECs that seek to benefit from the rate caps 
must also terminate their own traffic at the same rate.38  In 
2004, the FCC granted a petition from Core requesting 
forbearance from enforcement of the new markets and growth 
cap rules, finding that they were no longer in the public 
interest.39 
 
The ISP Remand Order was also challenged in the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.40  The court again 
rejected the FCC’s basis for exempting ISP-bound traffic 
from §251(b), but determined that there were probably “other 
legal bases for adopting the rules chosen by” the FCC.41  The 
court remanded to the FCC for better reasoning, but left the 
rules in place.42   
 
In 2008, after WorldCom successfully petitioned the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for a writ of mandamus, 
the FCC released the ISP Mandamus Order, in which the 
FCC concluded that ISP-bound traffic is subject to 
                                              
37 Id. at 9188-89 ¶ 81. 
38 Id. at 9193-94 ¶ 89. 
39 Petition of Core Comm., Inc. for Forbearance under 47 
U.S.C. § 160(C) from Application of the ISP Remand Order, 
19 FCC Rcd 20179, 20186 (2004) (Core Forbearance 
Order), aff’d, In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 255 F.3d 267 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
40 Worldcom v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
41 Id. 
42 Id.   
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§ 251(b)(5),43 but reasoned that the traffic could be treated 
differently due to the FCC’s broad § 201 authority to regulate 
and the savings clause in § 251(i).44  The effect of the order 
was to “maintain the $.0007 cap and the mirroring rule 
pursuant to [the FCC’s] section 201 authority,” as a 
placeholder until the Commission develops a more 
comprehensive compensation regime.45  Of the “interim” 
rules set out by the ISP Remand Order, the rate caps and 
mirroring rule are still in force today. 
 
C. 
Core and AT&T are both CLECs operating in 
Pennsylvania.  Between 2004 and 2009, AT&T provided 
local and long distance telephone service to its customers.  
Over the same time period, Core’s only customers were ISPs 
that provided dial-up internet connections to at-home internet 
users.  AT&T’s customers placed calls to Core’s customers in 
order to gain dial-up access to the internet.  All of the calls at 
issue were local, originating and terminating in the same local 
                                              
43 In re High-Cost Universal Serv. Support Fed.-State Joint 
Bd. on Universal Serv. Lifeline & Link Up Universal Serv. 
Contribution Methodology Numbering Res. Optimization 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Developing A Unified 
Intercarrier Comp. Regime Intercarrier Comp. for ISP-Bound 
Traffic IP-Enabled Servs., 24 FCC Rcd. 6475, 6478 ¶ 6, 6480 
¶ 8 (2008) (ISP Mandamus Order). 
44 Id. at 6483 ¶ 18; see also 47 U.S.C. § 251(i) (“Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the 
Commission’s authority under section 201 of this title.”). 
45 ISP Mandamus Order, 24 FCC Rcd. at 6489 ¶ 29. 
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exchange area.  Each AT&T customer’s call was delivered by 
AT&T to Verizon (the local ILEC), which then sent the call 
to Core, and Core terminated the call to the ISP. 
 
Core did not bill AT&T for these calls immediately.  
During the time period at issue, Core had an “intrastate 
switched access tariff” on file with the PPUC that specified 
Core’s rate for terminating long-distance calls but did not 
relate to local calls.  In January 2008, Core billed AT&T for 
calls dating back to June 2004 at the long-distance rate 
specified in its state tariff, $0.014/MOU.  AT&T refused to 
pay, claiming that it believed the traffic had been exchanged 
on a bill-and-keep basis.46 
 
On May 19, 2009, Core filed a complaint with the 
PPUC against AT&T, seeking payment at its long-distance 
rate for terminating the calls.  AT&T moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the dispute because the calls were subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC.  On December 5, 2012, the 
PPUC issued a final order holding that it had jurisdiction to 
hear the dispute, and that federal law, including the ISP 
Remand Order, applied.  The PPUC found that its ability to 
set rates for ISP-bound traffic was preempted by the ISP 
Remand Order, and because the rate charged by Core was 
greater than the federal cap, the federal cap of $0.0007/MOU 
should be applied as the new rate.  Accordingly, the PPUC 
ordered that AT&T pay Core for terminating calls at the 
lower rate.  Additionally, pursuant to a four-year state statute 
                                              
46 AT&T similarly exchanges local traffic on a bill-and-keep 
basis with other CLECs in the area.  For a definition of “bill-
and-keep,” see supra n. 35. 
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of limitations,47 the PPUC limited Core’s recovery to calls 
terminated on or after May 19, 2005.  The PPUC ultimately 
ordered AT&T to pay a total of $254,029.89 to Core by 
September 18, 2013. 
 
 AT&T then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking to enjoin 
enforcement of the PPUC’s order.  Soon after, AT&T moved 
for a preliminary injunction.  Because the suit involved only 
legal issues, the District Court converted AT&T’s motion to a 
motion for summary judgment.  In the District Court, as here, 
AT&T argued that the PPUC violated federal law because it  
1) lacked jurisdiction; 2) awarded charges at a rate not 
contained in any federal tariff or contract, violating 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 201 and 203; 3) allowed Core to recover reciprocal 
compensation without a reciprocal compensation 
arrangement, violating 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5); 
4) impermissibly engaged in retroactive ratemaking; and 
5) applied the incorrect statute of limitations.  The District 
Court agreed that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction, and 
accordingly, did not address the remaining four issues.  Core 
and the members of the PPUC appealed. 
 
After lodging the appeal, the PPUC filed a separate 
Petition for Declaratory Order with the FCC asking whether 
“state commissions have the authority to apply federal 
telecommunications law to adjudicate intercarrier 
compensation disputes” between two CLECs that indirectly 
exchanged ISP-bound calls without an interconnection 
agreement.  The formal public comment cycle on the PPUC’s 
petition closed July 30, 2014.  Before oral argument on 
                                              
47 See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1312. 
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November 19, 2014, we asked the FCC to comment on this 
case.  On November 4, 2014, the FCC sent a letter to the 
Court declining to do so, reasoning that it could not comment 
because there was an open FCC administrative proceeding 
presenting the same question between the same parties.  
Accordingly, after oral argument, we held the case c.a.v. until 
June 30, 2015, to give the FCC time to make a determination.  
As the FCC has yet to rule on the PPUC’s petition, we now 
proceed without its input. 
 
II.48 
The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC and 
gave it the power to regulate interstate communications.49  
The Act originally designated all communications as either 
interstate or intrastate, giving the FCC jurisdiction over solely 
interstate communications and leaving the states with 
jurisdiction over intrastate communications.50  In 1996, 
however, the TCA significantly altered the clean lines of 
jurisdiction established in the 1934 Act.51  “[T]he [TCA] 
                                              
48 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 to review a decision by a state public utility 
commission to ensure compliance with federal law.  See MCI, 
271 F.3d at 498.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the only issues presented are 
issues of law and there are no facts in dispute, our review is 
de novo.   
49 See 47 U.S.C. § 151(a). 
50 See id. § 152. 
51 Huber, et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 3.3.4; see 
also Phillip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative 
Federalism, and Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. 
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provides that various responsibilities are to be divided 
between the state and federal governments, making it an 
exercise in what has been termed cooperative federalism.”52  
“That is, ‘Congress enlisted the aid of state public utility 
commissions to ensure that local competition was 
implemented fairly and with due regard to the local 
conditions and the particular historical circumstances of local 
regulation under the prior regime.’”53   
                                                                                                     
L. Rev. 1692, 1743 (2001) (noting that although several of the 
1996 Act’s “provisions clearly anticipated that state agencies 
would play an important role and exercise considerable 
discretion in its implementation,” the Act nevertheless “failed 
to articulate a clear vision of federal-state relations”). 
52 Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 493 F.3d 333, 
335 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. 
Regulatory Bd. of P.R., 189 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1999)); see 
also Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission 
Servs., Inc., 323 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Act has 
been called one of the most ambitious regulatory programs 
operating under ‘cooperative federalism,’ and creates a 
regulatory framework that gives authority to state and federal 
entities in fostering competition in local telephone markets.”); 
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Texas, 208 F.3d 
475, 480 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the Act cannot divide the world of domestic telephone 
service ‘neatly into two hemispheres,’ one consisting of 
interstate service, over which the FCC has plenary authority, 
and the other consisting of intrastate service, over which the 
states retain exclusive jurisdiction.” (quoting La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986))). 
53 Id. (quoting Global NAPs, Inc. v. Mass. Dep’t of 




The parties ask us to determine whether ISP-bound 
traffic is interstate or “jurisdictionally mixed,” with the 
supposed attendant implications that, in the former case, the 
FCC has exclusive jurisdiction, and, in the latter, state and 
federal jurisdiction exist concurrently.  The picture, however, 
is more complicated. 
 
A. 
Whether a particular type of communications is 
interstate or intrastate is a technical question.  To determine 
the answer to that question, we look to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC’s regulations 
interpreting that statute.  We “defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulations, even in a legal brief, unless 
the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulations or there is any other reason to suspect that the 
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.”54  This 
deference applies whether or not the question at issue is 
jurisdictional.55.   
 
                                              
54 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 
(2011) (internal formatting removed); accord Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012). 
55 See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1871 
(2013) (“[W]e have consistently held that Chevron applies to 
cases in which an agency adopts a construction of a 




As described above, the FCC employs end-to-end 
jurisdictional analysis to determine whether communications 
are intrastate or interstate.56  While the parties in this case ask 
us to determine whether the traffic is interstate or 
jurisdictionally mixed, the FCC has not always been so 
precise, often using the terms interchangeably.  Thus, while 
we read the FCC’s rulings to mean that the traffic is 
interstate, the inquiry will not end there. 
 
The FCC’s first pass at the question came in the 
Declaratory Ruling, where the Commission found that local 
ISP-bound traffic was “jurisdictionally mixed” because it 
“appears to be largely interstate.”57  Three more times 
throughout the order, the FCC used the phrase “largely 
interstate” to describe the traffic.58  After the D.C. Circuit 
vacated the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC revisited its original 
finding in the ISP Remand Order.  There the FCC used the 
terms “jurisdictionally mixed” and “interstate” 
interchangeably to describe both the original ruling and the 
traffic itself.59  In other places, the ISP Remand Order 
                                              
56 Bell Atl., 206 F.3d at 3. 
57 14 FCC Rcd. at 3690 ¶ 1. 
58 See id. at 3703-06 ¶¶ 23, 25, 27. 
59 Compare ISP Remand Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9152 ¶ 1 
(“We previously found in the Declaratory Ruling that such 
traffic is interstate traffic subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission under section 201 of the Act and is not, 
therefore, subject to the reciprocal compensation provisions 
of section 251(b)(5).” (footnotes omitted)), and id at 9162 ¶ 
21 (“In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission concluded 
that Internet-bound traffic was jurisdictionally interstate and, 
thus, not subject to section 251(b)(5).”), with id. at 9160 ¶ 14 
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referred to ISP-bound traffic as being “predominantly 
interstate”60 or having an “interstate component.”61  In one of 
the same paragraphs in which the order refers to the traffic as 
“predominantly interstate,” the FCC also noted that it has 
“long held” ISP-bound traffic “to be interstate.”62  Thus, the 
ISP Remand Order treats the traffic as interstate, but treats 
“jurisdictionally mixed” as a synonym. 
 
The FCC has addressed this question elsewhere as 
well.  In 2011, the Ninth Circuit decided AT&T 
Communications of California v. Pac-West 
Telecommunications.63  That case was factually similar to the 
one at hand, stemming from an AT&T subsidiary’s refusal to 
pay for traffic exchanged with a CLEC with which it did not 
have an interconnection agreement.  Indeed, the California 
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) ruled against AT&T, 
just as the PPUC did here, and AT&T subsequently sued the 
CPUC and Pac-West in federal court, challenging, among 
other things, CPUC’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute.  When 
the Ninth Circuit asked the FCC for its view, the Commission 
filed an amicus brief, stating that it “has consistently held that 
ISP-bound communications are jurisdictionally interstate” 
                                                                                                     
(“The Commission found, therefore, that ISP-bound traffic . . 
. is jurisdictionally mixed and largely interstate, and, for that 
reason, the Commission found that the reciprocal 
compensation obligations of section 251(b)(5) do not apply to 
this traffic.”). 
60 Id. at 9152 ¶ 1, 9164 ¶ 28, 9165 ¶ 29, 9176 ¶ 54. 
61 Id. at 9175 ¶ 52. 
62 Id. at 9164 ¶ 28. 
63 651 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2011).   
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based on its end-to-end jurisdictional analysis.64  But the 
same brief also asked the court to refrain from deciding 
whether the CPUC had jurisdiction.65  The CPUC had applied 
a state tariff that exceeded the federal rate cap, and the FCC 
argued—and the court agreed—that the court did not need to 
decide the jurisdictional question because the ISP Remand 
Order applied even between two CLECs and the CPUC’s 
application of the higher rate was preempted by the federal 
rate caps.66  Thus, while we are left to address the question of 
a state commission’s jurisdiction for the first time, the FCC’s 
amicus brief states its position on its own jurisdiction clearly, 
and it accords with the statements in the ISP Remand Order. 
 
Deferring to the FCC’s determination, we find that 
local ISP-bound traffic is interstate for jurisdictional 
purposes.67  Nevertheless, as a factual matter, the mixed 
nature of the traffic is not irrelevant. 
 
B. 
We draw two further lessons from the FCC’s treatment 
of the jurisdictional question.  First, the jurisdictional 
determination reflects only a finding about the Commission’s 
power to regulate under Section 201, not a view that its 
                                              
64 Amicus Br. of FCC, Pac-West, 651 F.3d 980 (No. 08-
17030), at 7-8, 29 (Pac-West Amicus Br.). 
65 Id. at 29. 
66 Pac-West, 651 F.3d at 994. 
67 Accord Pac-West, 651 F.3d at 990 (“[T]here is no question 
that, for jurisdictional purposes, ISP-bound traffic is interstate 
in nature.  ISP-bound traffic is therefore subject to the FCC’s 
congressionally-delegated jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). 
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jurisdiction is exclusive.  “A matter may be subject to FCC 
jurisdiction, without the FCC having exercised that 
jurisdiction and preempted state regulation.”68  This makes 
sense here because the thrust of the ISP Remand Order’s 
analysis focused on how the FCC’s broad § 201 authority 
allows it to create the interim rules under the savings clause in 
§ 251(i).  The analysis established the FCC’s power, but did 
not restrict or even address competing power from the states.   
 
Several points further support this conclusion.  By 
using the terms “interstate” and “jurisdictionally mixed” 
interchangeably in the ISP Remand Order, the FCC 
demonstrated that it could not have been ruling about 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Based on the traditional understanding 
of the terms, purely interstate traffic is exclusively committed 
to the FCC,69 and jurisdictionally mixed traffic is subject to 
                                              
68 Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 444 F.3d 
59, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (Global NAPs I); see alsoPac-West, 
651 F.3d at 991 (“[I]t is also well settled that, with the ISP 
Remand Order and related pronouncements, the FCC has not 
exercised its jurisdiction over all manifestations of ISP-bound 
traffic.”). 
69 See, e.g., In re Vonage, 19 FCC Rcd. at 22413 ¶ 17 (“When 
a service’s end points are in different states or between a state 
and a point outside the United States, the service is deemed a 
purely interstate service subject to the Commission’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.”); In re Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. and the 
Assoc. Bell Sys. Cos., 56 FCC. 2d 14, 20 ¶ 21 (1975) (“[T]he 
States do not have jurisdiction over interstate 
communications.”), aff’d, California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
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“dual federal/state jurisdiction.”70  If the FCC believed the 
TCA committed ISP-bound traffic to its exclusive 
jurisdiction, it would have distinguished between the two.  
Elsewhere in the text, “the Order also explicitly reserves state 
commission authority in certain relevant matters.”71  Finally, 
in the Pac-West amicus brief, the FCC both called ISP-bound 
traffic interstate and declined to take a position on whether 
the jurisdiction is exclusive.72  This would make no sense if 
interstate traffic necessarily implies exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
Second, according to the FCC, “‘mixed-use’ or 
‘jurisdictionally-mixed’ services are generally subject to dual 
federal/state jurisdiction, except where it is impossible or 
impractical to separate the service’s intrastate from interstate 
components and the state regulation of the intrastate 
component interferes with valid federal rules or policies.”73  
That is to say, where—as here—the interstate and intrastate 
components are inseparable,74 state jurisdiction over mixed 
use services such as ISP-bound local traffic is tied to conflict 
preemption.  This view recognizes the “realities of technology 
and economics that belie such a clean parceling of 
responsibility” between the state and federal governments.75  
                                              
70 In re Vonage, 19 FCC Rcd. at 22413 ¶ 17. 
71 Global NAPs II, 454 F.3d at 100 (citing ISP Remand Order 
at 9187 ¶ 79 (A carrier may rebut presumptions regarding the 
amount of traffic that is ISP-bound by providing evidence “to 
the appropriate state commission.”)).   
72 Pac-West Amicus Br. at 8, 29. 
73 Id. 
74 See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 543 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
75 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 360. 
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A state is therefore both preempted and lacking jurisdiction to 
regulate ISP-bound local traffic if and only if the state 
regulation conflicts with federal law.  Thus, “the question 
before us is whether the FCC intended in the ISP Remand 
Order to exercise its jurisdiction over the precise issue here, 
to the exclusion of state regulation.”76 
 
Discussing its implementation of the new rate caps in 
the ISP Remand Order, the FCC was clear that state rates 
were preempted and state commissions no longer had 
authority to set rates higher than the cap.77  Because the FCC 
“exercise[d] [its] authority under section 201 to determine the 
appropriate intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic . . 
. state commissions [] no longer have authority to address this 
issue.”78  Read in isolation, AT&T’s interpretation—that the 
FCC meant to effect field preemption—is plausible.  But just 
two paragraphs prior, the FCC was equally explicit that the 
rate caps are indeed caps and do not apply to rates lower than 
those federally mandated.79  If there remain state rates to 
which the rate caps do not apply, the FCC cannot have 
intended field preemption.80  This reading is further 
confirmed by the ISP Mandamus Order, in which the FCC 
“conclude[d] that it is appropriate to retain [the rate cap and 
                                              
76 Global NAPs I, 444 F.3d at 71. 
77 ISP Remand Order, 16 FCC Rcd. at 9189 ¶ 82.   
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 9188 ¶ 80. 
80 See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 
(2015) (field preemption “foreclose[s] any state regulation in 
the area” while conflict preemption “exists where compliance 




mirroring rule], but only on a transitional basis until a state 
commission . . . has established reciprocal compensation rates 
that are at or below $.0007 per minute-of-use.”81  The FCC 
clearly contemplated states’ continued involvement in 
ratesetting, and therefore we must conclude that the FCC 
meant only to preempt rates that conflict with its own 
regulation; that is, rates that exceed the cap.82   
 
                                              
81 ISP Mandamus Order, 24 FCC Rcd. at 6584 ¶ 198.   
82 The Pac-West Amicus Brief argued that the FCC “meant to 
pre-empt state reciprocal compensation regulation of ISP-
bound traffic,” and in the alternative that states cannot set a 
“rate for ISP-bound traffic under state law that exceeded the 
prescribed federal rate.”  Pac-West Amicus Br. at 26-27.  
Unlike a determination of its jurisdiction, however, we do not 
defer to an agency’s legal determination regarding 
preemption, instead accepting it as influential, “depending on 
its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.”  Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009); see also Pac-West, 651 
F.3d at 998 (“Although we do not defer to ‘an agency’s 
conclusion that state law is preempted,’ we do defer to the 
FCC’s interpretation of the compensation regime it created, 
barring some ‘reason to suspect that the interpretation does 
not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question.’” (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576 and 
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 
(2011))).  As explained above, when read in full, the ISP 
Remand Order implies not field preemption but conflict 
preemption, and a mere litigation position that argues for the 
former first and the latter in the alternative (submitted in a 
separate case, no less) is neither thorough, consistent, nor 
persuasive enough to merit deference here. 
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When faced with the possibility of applying rates that 
exceed the federal cap, the PPUC recognized the primacy of 
federal law and reduced the applicable rates to match the 
federal limit.  This is where this case diverges from the facts 
of Pac-West.  By lowering the state rates it applied, the PPUC 
avoided a conflict with federal law.  Because there was no 
conflict, the PPUC’s actions were not preempted. 
 
AT&T argues, however, and the District Court 
concluded, that state commissions may only act pursuant to 
their role in mediating and arbitrating interconnection 
agreements under § 252 of the TCA.83  But the TCA itself 
invites state involvement in more than § 252.84  AT&T’s 
argument ignores both the FCC’s statements regarding state 
commissions’ involvement in ratesetting and the cooperative 
federalism principles inherent in the TCA by presuming that 
the statute stripped states of all authority to act unless 
                                              
83 Section 252 clearly does not apply here because there is no 
interconnection agreement and both parties are CLECs, 
meaning neither party has a duty to negotiate an agreement.  
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c). 
84 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(3) (“In prescribing and enforcing 
regulations to implement the requirements of this section, the 
Commission shall not preclude the enforcement of any 
regulation, order, or policy of a State commission that-- (A) 
establishes access and interconnection obligations of local 
exchange carriers; (B) is consistent with the requirements of 
this section; and (C) does not substantially prevent 
implementation of the requirements of this section and the 
purposes of this part.”). 
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delegated back to them.85  The picture is simply not that 
clear-cut.86   
AT&T’s reliance on MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
v. Bell Atlantic Pennsylvania87 is similarly misplaced.  MCI 
concerned sovereign immunity for states arbitrating 
interconnection agreements under § 252.  Under the Eleventh 
Amendment, we held that the states were granted a “gratuity” 
and were “voluntarily regulating on behalf of Congress” 
because Congress could have withdrawn all power from 
states, but instead allowed the states to keep some.88  
Accordingly, such states waived sovereign immunity and 
could be sued.89  But we also reasoned that although 
“Congress could have made that preemption complete,” it did 
not.90  Rather, we stated that Congress “federalized the 
regulation of competition for local telecommunications 
service.”91 Based on the integrated system of cooperative 
                                              
85 See AT&T Br. at 27 (“Neither the Communications Act, 
the 1996 Act, nor the FCC have delegated jurisdiction to the 
PUC to set rates or otherwise regulate interstate traffic outside 
of a Section 252 proceeding.”). 
86 Accord Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 397 (“It would be gross 
understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of 
clarity.”). 
87 271 F.3d 491  
88 Id. at 510 (quotation omitted).  
89 Id. at 498 (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)). 
90 Id. at 510.   
91 Id. at 509 (emphasis added); see also id. at 510 (noting that 
“[t]he Act . . . validly preempted state regulation over 
competition to provide local telecommunications service” and 
that “[r]egulating local telecommunications competition 
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federalism that we have previously endorsed,92 and which we 
reiterate today, we hold that although ISP-bound traffic is 
interstate, states retain jurisdiction to regulate ISP-bound 
traffic where the state regulations do not conflict with federal 
law. 
III. 
Having established that the PPUC had jurisdiction to 
hear the dispute, we turn to  AT&T’s additional arguments 
that the PPUC’s Orders violate federal law in four other ways. 
 
A. 
AT&T contends that the PPUC Orders violate 47 
U.S.C. §§ 201 and 203 because Core neither filed a federal 
tariff that would apply to billing for interstate services nor 
negotiated a contract with AT&T; thus, in light of that fact 
billing at any rate is “unreasonable.”93  For support, AT&T 
looks to a number of FCC adjudications where the “FCC 
rejected the idea that a CLEC could bill for interstate services 
                                                                                                     
under the 1996 Act no longer is . . . an ‘otherwise lawful’ or 
‘otherwise permissible’ activity for a state . . . [but] is an 
activity in which states and state commissions are not entitled 
to engage except by the express leave of Congress” 
(emphases added)). 
92 Verizon Pa., 493 F.3d at 335. 
93 Considering that AT&T observes multiple times in its brief 
that it, as a CLEC, has no duty to negotiate in good faith, 
AT&T Br. at 11, 13, 35, and the PPUC observed in its initial 
decision that AT&T refused to negotiate in fact, PPUC Initial 
Decision, ¶¶ 42-44, J.A. 196-97, the latter accusation here 
that Core “failed to negotiate” a contract rings hollow. 
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without a federal tariff or contract covering the services.”94  
But the cases AT&T cites all involve interstate switched-
access services—that is, intercarrier compensation for long-
distance calls between states.95  As we point out above, 
although ISP-bound local traffic is jurisdictionally interstate, 
it is still subject to state control unless otherwise preempted 
by the FCC.  Nothing in the ISP Remand Order requires 
federal tariffing; had the FCC intended that ISP-bound traffic 
rates be governed by federal tariffs, it would have set rates to 
be tariffed, not rate caps that set upper limits to state tariffs.  
ISP-bound traffic is therefore fundamentally different from 
interstate switched-access services, and there is no federal 
tariffing requirement. 
B. 
AT&T next contends that the PPUC Orders violate 47 
U.S.C. § 251(b)(5), which requires all LECs to “establish 
reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and 
termination of telecommunications.”  According to AT&T, 
the statutory language explicitly requires an “arrangement,” 
i.e., a contract, before a LEC can recover § 251(b)(5) charges.  
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.  First, 
while § 251(b)(5) applies to ISP-bound traffic, the reciprocal 
arrangements for that traffic are governed by the ISP Remand 
Order.  This is the holding of the ISP Mandamus Order,96 and 
                                              
94 AT&T Br. 49. 
95 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. All Am. Tel. Co., 28 FCC Rcd. 
3477, 3494 ¶ 37 (2013) (confirming that LECs must file “file 
and maintain tariffs with the Commission for interstate 
switched access services”).   
96 ISP Mandamus Order, 24 FCC Rcd. 6478 ¶ 6 (“[A]lthough 
ISP-bound traffic falls within the scope of section 251(b)(5), 
31 
 
as the Ninth Circuit held in Pac-West, the ISP Remand Order 
applies as much between two CLECs as between and an 
ILEC and a CLEC.97  Thus, because the PPUC complied with 
the ISP Remand Order, it also complied with § 251(b)(5). 
 
AT&T’s argument also invites an odd result.  Core is 
required by statute to terminate AT&T’s traffic irrespective of 
a billing arrangement being put in place.  Thus, if AT&T 
refuses to pay, Core is left no recourse because it followed the 
law and terminated all the calls it received even though it did 
not first arrange for payment.  This view amounts to a default 
bill-and-keep arrangement, whereby neither side must pay 
unless each side comes to a voluntary agreement.  But that 
was precisely the “new markets rule” that the FCC deemed no 
longer in the public interest in the Core Forbearance Order.98  
If that were the meaning of the ISP Remand Order and 
§ 251(b)(5), the new markets rule never would have been 
necessary.  And if we were to interpret § 251(b)(5) this way, 
we would render null the FCC’s finding that such a rule is no 
longer in the public interest. 
 
C. 
AT&T next argues that because no tariff was 
established, any rate above $0/MOU is impermissible 
retroactive ratemaking.  Because these calls were local calls, 
the intrastate long distance tariff Core had filed with the 
                                                                                                     
this interstate, interexchange traffic is to be afforded different 
treatment from other section 251(b)(5) traffic pursuant to our 
authority under section 201 and 251(i) of the Act.”). 
97 Pac-West, 651 F.3d at 994. 
98 19 FCC Rcd. at 20186 ¶ 21. 
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PPUC filed did not directly apply; it applied only between 
two different local exchange areas within the state.  To accept 
AT&T’s position, we would again be required to find that the 
default rate is $0/MOU, which is once again the new markets 
rule.  But that is not the primary reason this argument fails. 
 
“The purpose of the rule against retroactivity, and the 
closely related filed rate doctrine, is to ensure 
predictability.”99  The question is therefore whether, absent an 
agreement, it was predictable that the state commission would 
apply a rate equal to the federal rate cap.  AT&T was on 
notice since 2001 that it could be subject to payment for the 
exchange of ISP-bound traffic and on notice since 2004 that a 
$0/MOU rate would not be the general default.  While AT&T 
assumed this traffic was being transmitted on a bill-and-keep 
basis and it had bill-and-keep arrangements with other 
CLECs, Core charges other CLECs it interconnects with,100 
so there is no reason to think AT&T’s assumption is the 
industry norm. 
 
Though it may have been unclear precisely which rate 
the PPUC would apply, the federal cap was not only 
foreseeable, but the most likely rate.  Four logical possibilities 
existed:  Core’s intrastate switched access tariff of 
$0.014/MOU, the TELRIC rate—a state commission rate 
calculated to defray costs101—of $0.002439/MOU, the federal 
                                              
99 Qwest Corp. v. Koppendrayer, 436 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
100 PPUC Initial Decision ¶ 73, J.A. 200. 
101 “Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost (‘TELRIC’) is 
used to figure the cost of phone service based on incremental 
cost of new equipment and new labor, or costs that would 
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cap of $0.0007/MOU, or $0/MOU.  The first two were clearly 
not permissible not only because they conflict with the ISP 
Remand Order, but also because the rates are so much higher 
than the federal cap that AT&T should have known that 
whatever eventual rate the PPUC thought was fair would be 
capped by federal law.  Of the two remaining choices, 
applying the cap as a rate was much more likely than 
allowing no compensation at all.  Therefore, the PPUC Orders 
did not violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking. 
 
D. 
Finally, AT&T argues that the PPUC Orders violate 
federal law by applying a four-year state statute of limitations 
to Core’s claims instead of 47 U.S.C. § 415, which applies to 
“[a]ll actions at law by carriers for recovery of their lawful 
charges.”  But AT&T concedes that § 415(a) applies only to 
charges that are subject to federal tariffing requirements.102  
We also need not address whether the federal or state statute 
of limitations applies because, as the PPUC noted in its order, 
the proper federal statute of limitations is the four-year catch-
all found at 28 U.S.C. § 1658.  The catch-all applies to any 
federal civil action enacted after 1990 without a specific 
associated cause of action.103  This includes § 251(b)(5), 
which became law in 1996, and under which this case 
                                                                                                     
apply in a fully competitive environment.”  PPUC Initial 
Decision at 21 n.12, J.A. 200. 
102 See Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779, 786 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
103 28 U.S.C. § 1658. 
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arose.104  Thus, the PPUC’s application of a four-year statute 
of limitations is proper. 
IV. 
AT&T had every reason to believe it could be charged 
for its customers’ ISP-bound traffic that Core terminated.  
Rather than voluntarily negotiating an interconnection 
agreement with Core, AT&T waited, putting the onus on Core 
to come forward and negotiate.  In reality, the PPUC found 
that Core was entitled to compensation for the traffic, and if 
AT&T wanted to negotiate a bill-and-keep arrangement, it 
should have done so. 
 
Federal law does not require that Core be compensated 
for the traffic.  The TCA’s system of cooperative federalism 
exists specifically so that state public utility commissions can 
determine these kinds of questions for themselves, “with due 
regard to the local conditions and the particular historical 
circumstances of local regulation.”105  The FCC established 
the boundary of the PPUC’s jurisdiction by implementing rate 
caps.  When the PPUC chose to apply a rate equal to the 
federal rate cap, it respected that boundary, and furthered the 
very purpose of the TCA’s scheme.   
 
 
                                              
104 See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 
381 (2004) (maintaining that § 1658 applies not only “to 
entirely new sections of the United States Code[,]” but also to 
“amendment[s] to an existing statute”). 
105 Huber, et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 3.3.4, 
quoted in Core Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 335. 
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We will therefore vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand this case with instructions to grant 
summary judgment in favor of Core and the members of the 
PPUC. 
